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From a comparative perspective, two aspects of the Swiss party system
are particularly salient: the large number of parties and the relative
stability of the distribution of power. Apart from social and cultural
cleavages, the electoral system (PR), the competitiveness encouraged by
the federal state and direct democracy can be seen as responsible for party
proliferation in Switzerland.1 Political stability stems from the integrative
force of consociationalism, which has its roots in the small size of the
country, its political culture, and the system of direct democracy. In
Switzerland the most important parties are continuously represented in
government, and there is no change of power between the parties in
government and the parties in opposition. The composition of the
national, as well as almost all cantonal, governments quite often remains
unchanged over a long period. Since 1959, the national government, for
example, has consisted of two members of the Radical Democrats (FDP),
the Christian Democrats (CVP) and the Social Democrats (SPS), and one
of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). This composition is commonly
referred to as the ‘magic formula’.
The combination of a large number of parties and political stability is not
without interest, since the literature on party research, influenced by the
experience of the Weimar Republic, the French Fourth Republic, and post-
war Italy, for long treated multi-party systems as inherently unstable
compared with two-party systems, such as that of Great Britain.2
However, in the last few years the Swiss party system seems to have
become less stable. The 1995 and 1999 national elections brought about
remarkable shifts in voting. The question is: will Swiss politics enter a
period of instability and will there be serious changes in the party system?
To grasp the importance of these changes, analyses restricted to the national
level might be too narrow. It is a commonly accepted characteristic of the
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Swiss party system that the subnational level is of great importance. The
federal structure of the political system has not only hampered the creation
of powerful centralised national parties and led to much stronger cantonal
parties,3 it has also brought about distinctive party systems with different
power configurations. Moreover, cantonal organisations of the same party
are not always backed by the same segments of the population. The Swiss
party system has thus to be regarded as one composed of 26 different party
systems.
Thus, it is of crucial importance to know to what extent changes on the
national level correspond with cantonal trends and whether cantonal trends
precede national trends or vice versa. The different size of the voting
districts (cantons) for national elections, with a number of districts in which
more than 30 per cent of the vote is needed to gain a seat, not only favours
bigger parties, but might lead to an underestimation of the changes
occurring. Yet the nationalisation of politics4 might have led to the
disappearance of the differences between cantonal and national party
systems.
The Number of Parties: A Decrease on National Level and an Increase in
some of the Cantons
In the 1999 national elections, members of 14 parties were elected to the
National Council (Nationalrat). This high number, of course, reveals only
part of the story. Not all of these parties are of equal importance, some of
them exist only in one or a few of the 26 cantons, whereas others are
represented in all cantons. Basically, two groups of parties can be
distinguished: the four governmental parties FDP, CVP, SVP and SP and the
smaller parties like GPS, LPS, EVP, SD and others.5 On a national level, the
former group shares between 70 and 90 per cent of the vote, while the latter
parties, individually, hardly gained more than five per cent of the vote.6
To appreciate the degree of fragmentation of the Swiss party system and
its cantonal party systems in a comparative perspective, we need to know
more about the parties elected. Giovanni Sartori’s7 criteria for the parties
that ‘count’ are not very helpful, because the Swiss system of direct
democracy allows even smaller parties to play a relatively important role
and some are quite dominant in some of the cantons.8 Thus, the assessment
of the parties that count on national level and in the 26 cantons remains a
rather hazardous and arbitrary task. Instead, comparative studies frequently
refer to the effective number of parties, a measure introduced by Markku
Laasko and Rein Taggepera9 based on the Rae Fragmentation Index. The
effective number of parties index has the advantage that it not only takes
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into account the number of parties, but also their size. Furthermore, it can
easily be computed from electoral statistics. 
After the 1999 national elections, the effective number of parties on
national level amounted to 5.9 parties. Figure 1 reveals that this number is
considerably higher than it used to be before the 1960s, but is remarkably
lower than in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Responsible for the two peaks
since 1945 were – to the detriment of the four governmental parties – the
right-wing anti-immigration parties SD (formerly NA) and Republicans in
1971, and the Green Party (GPS) and its counterpart, the anti-ecologist
Automobile Party (FPS), in 1991. Nevertheless, the effective number of
parties in Switzerland can be considered as high compared with other
countries. In the last four-year period of the twentieth century, only
Belgium, Italy and France had a higher effective number of parties; the
European mean is much lower and shows astonishing stability until the
1980s followed by a slight increase. 
At first glance, the cantonal party systems do not reveal a similarly
dynamic pattern. The mean is considerably lower than in the figures on a
national level and the general trend only shows a slight and steady increase,
the short-term ups and downs can hardly be distinguished. This is not
surprising since average numbers have the inconvenience that trends are
levelled out. 
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FIGURE 1
THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES
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Figure 2 shows the trends for four different groups of cantons, built
according to the average effective number of parties they had in the 1980s.
The cantons’ effective numbers of parties at that time were between two and
well over 7.9. Figure 2 reveals significantly that the downward trend in the
1990s on national level also holds for cantons with a high number of parties
in the 1980s.10 The average of those four cantons (ZH, BL, BS and GE)
which had more than 5.6 parties in the 1980s clearly decreases. For the
cantons with fewer parties the average number increases: only slightly for
those with less than 2.5 parties in the 1980s (UR, OW, NW, VS),
considerably for those with between 2.6 and 4 parties (LU, SZ, GL, ZG, FR,
SO, SG, TI, VD, NE) and for those with between 4.1 and 5.5 parties (BE,
SH, GR, AG, TG and JU).
Are there any characteristic differences between cantons with a different
number of parties and different trends in the 1990s? It is – apart from a few
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FIGURE 2
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES IN DIFFERENT GROUPS OF CANTONS
Notes: N= average effective number of parties in the two electoral periods 1980–83 and
1984–87. 
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exceptions (GE, JU) – in the confessionally mixed or dominantly Protestant
cantons that the effective number of parties was high in the 1980s and
decreased in the 1990s. Especially salient was the decrease in the cantons
with important cities and universities like Zurich, Geneva and Basel.
Cantons with a low, but slightly increasing, number of parties were – apart
from GL, VD, NE – dominantly Catholic and of larger size. Almost no
increase was found in smaller, off-centre, Catholic cantons dominated by
the CVP.11
As far as the number of parties is concerned, there are thus quite
important differences between the cantonal party systems and the national
party system as it is depicted by national election results. The trend on the
national level does not necessarily match all trends on the cantonal level.
Nevertheless, the differences seem to disappear. The cantonal party systems
become more alike, converging towards a medium effective number of
parties between four and five, and the national party system is reduced to
well below six parties. If there is anything like a nationalisation of cantonal
politics, this should, in the long run, lead to similar party systems on all
levels. 
Volatility: Increase on a Low Level
Given the multitude of parties, the stability of the parties’ vote and seat
shares during the twentieth century is remarkable. This reveals, for
example, the elasticity of voting strength, measured by the percentage
difference between the largest and the least share of the vote which a party
obtained at elections over a given time period.12 The best and worst results
of SVP and CVP since the introduction of the proportional system in 1919
and up to the 1995 election differ by less than seven per cent. For the FDP,
this difference is less than nine per cent; only the SP passes the ten per cent
mark. And the mean change, that is the average change in the percentage of
the vote obtained by a party between each pair of elections during a period,13
is very small. For the four governmental parties, it is 0.9 for the FDP, 0.7 for
CVP, 1.3 for SVP and 1.4 for SP. All these parties would – according to the
study by Maria Maguire14 – belong to the group of parties with very little
change.
Measured at the level of the whole Swiss party system, the volatility, that
is half of the total change in percentage of votes between parties within a
party system,15 is also rather low compared with other countries. The
average aggregated volatility in the time between 1919 and 1999 is five per
cent. However, in the 1990s this varied. The average on national level in the
three elections in the 1990s was up to 7.8 per cent, whereas in the years
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before it was much lower (see Figure 3). Only in 1971 and before and after
World War II did Switzerland’s party system witness similar volatility.
Especially salient is the low volatility in the 1950s and early 1960s, when
the magic formula was established in 1959.
The comparison with the developments in the cantonal party systems
reveals that there is a certain similarity between the two curves, but it cannot
be determined on which level new tendencies come out first. Again the
differences between the cantons are considerable. In the last electoral period
of the twentieth century, cantons like ZH, LU, OW, BS, SH and GE showed
aggregated volatility of over ten per cent. In cantons like SZ, NW, SG, GR,
TI and VS volatility was below four per cent. 
The 24 cantonal party systems16 offer a quite unique opportunity to test
the relation between the number of parties and the stability of a party system
under almost laboratory-like conditions. Figure 4 reveals that cantons with
a higher number of parties in the 1990s generally also have higher volatility.
The correlation between the two variables is significant. The term ‘political
stability’ has, of course, to be used cautiously. It can only be shown that the
more parties there are, the more election results tend to be subject to change.
Nothing can be said about the distribution of power and the stability of
policies. 
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FIGURE 3
VOLATILITY
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Failure and Success of the Different Parties: The Ascent of the Swiss
People’s Party
The effective number of parties and aggregate volatility mirror quite
accurately the changes in the Swiss party system in the 1990s, they remain,
however, on an abstract level. The next step is to have a closer look at the
most important parties. 
The success of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in the 1990s is probably
the most striking in the whole electoral history of the Swiss party system
(see Figure 5). Not more than 25 years ago, the SVP fell below ten per cent
and was almost doomed to disappear. It was only with the 1991 elections
that this downward trend stopped and, in the elections of 1995, the party
reached an unexpected 15 per cent. The 1999 elections finally marked a real
breakthrough. The SVP became the strongest party with 22.5 per cent of the
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FIGURE 4
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES (1990s)  AND VOLATILITY (1990s)
IN 24 SWISS CANTONS
Note: Pearson corr: .548, sig.: .01; V90 and N90: average volatility and average effective
number of parties in the three electoral periods 1988–91, 1992–95 and 1996–99.
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vote (+ 7.6). It is the first time since the National Council (Nationalrat) was
first elected by means of proportional representation in 1919 that such an
important shift has occurred. In addition to its traditional strongholds, the
party not only consolidated its position in cantons like LU, ZG, SO, AR,
SG, where it entered the national political arena in the 1995 elections, but
also gained votes in ‘new’ cantons like BS, AI, VS, GE and JU. The success
of this formerly agrarian party is due to profound transformation, as it was
forced to reorient itself because of the shrinking of its traditional
membership base of farmers and merchants. It now favours a free-market
economy and a reduction in state expenditure; however, its agricultural
policy still tolerates massive state intervention. Domestically, the party puts
great emphasis on the maintenance of law and order, is strongly anti-
immigration, and in foreign policy it vehemently opposes Switzerland’s
accession to supranational organisations (EU, UNO). 
The trends for the other parties are less spectacular, but not less
significant. The Radical Party (FDP), which advocates a liberal economic
order with a business-friendly framework, has been the biggest and most
important party for a long time and has been considered as the founding
party of the Swiss nation state; it had already experienced a decline
following the introduction of the proportional system in 1919 and lasting
until 1939. After a period of ups and downs, a new downward trend started
after the elections of 1983. With the 1999 elections, the FDP for the first
time lost its leading position among the three bourgeois parties.
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FIGURE 5
ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE OF THE FOUR GOVERNMENTAL PARTIES IN
NATIONAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS
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The Christian Democratic Party (CVP) professes the Christian social
doctrine and advocates the establishment of a social market economy,
allowing for state interventions in order to protect workers, craftsmen and
agriculture. On ethical and moral issues, it adopts a conservative stance, and
it attributes great importance to family values. The figures for the CVP
show that there has been a marked drop since 1963, and more particularly
since 1979. It is still suffering from the ongoing process of secularisation
and is now the smallest of the four governmental parties.
Finally, the Social Democratic Party (SPS) stands for the protection of
the socially weak and the environment. It is an advocate of subsidy
programmes, active state intervention in the economy, and the creation of a
strong social safety net that does not push the socially disadvantaged into
the role of supplicants. The history of the Social Democrats is more
agitated, which is partly due to the temporary success of other, more
extreme left-wing and green parties. The SP fell below the 25 per cent mark
before and immediately after the events of 1968, and below 20 per cent in
the 1987 and 1991 elections, which were strongly influenced by
environmental issues. In 1995 it recovered and even became the second
strongest party in 1999 with little more than 22 per cent.
The smaller parties lost much of their attraction towards the end of the
twentieth century. The LdU disappeared, the FPS is about to do the same,
the Greens have been able to hold their share of the votes, but suffered a
reduction of 1.1 per cent in the 1995 elections. The SD also suffered quite
important losses and the LPS minor ones, whereas the shares of EVP and
EDU remained unchanged. Thus, with the 1999 elections the four
governmental parties again controlled more than 80 per cent of the vote;
however, the clear winners in the last decade of the twentieth century were
the parties at the poles of the left–right dimension, the SVP and the SP.
The 1999 elections also brought a new situation in regard to the
composition of the national government. The success of the SVP was
followed by the claim for a second seat in the Federal Council, which was
refused by the other parties at the end of 1999 in the re-election of the
government following the election of the National Council. However, the
magic formula has lost much of its enchantment and changes are more
probable than ever.
In the light of these developments, the question is whether the Swiss
party system has lost its famous stability. There is obviously a reduction in
the number of parties and an increase in volatility. This is not completely
new. Long term analyses reveal that the Swiss party system has had ups
and downs as far as volatility and the number of parties are concerned. But
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altogether the Swiss party system seems – apart from a few exceptions – to
be moving towards a four-party system with the four governmental parties
being even more dominant. At a first glance this supports Seymour Lipset
and Stein Rokkan’s thesis of the frozen party systems.17 Their cleavage
theory explains the emergence of the four parties quite well. However, the
success of the SVP also threatens the very essence of the Swiss four-party
coalition. Especially the two parties in the middle, FDP and CVP, are under
enormous pressure and a reorganisation of the Swiss party system has
become more probable than ever. And finally, the Lipset–Rokkan thesis
only holds as long as the four parties still represent the same cleavages and
stand for the same political ideologies. It is on the level of the parties and
their organisations that the answer to this question of stability is to be
found. 
WEAK PARTY ORGANISATIONS, DEALIGNMENT AND REORIENTATION 
The electoral records of the parties tell only part of the story. Without
leaving any traces in electoral statistics, changes might take place within the
parties, for example, in regard to the parties’ organisations, their
relationship to their adherents and members and their political orientation.
It is, therefore, time to have a closer look at the parties themselves.
Swiss political parties are considered to be weak.18 Most analysts point
to the parties’ handicap vis-à-vis interest groups and social movements.
Further signs of their weakness are connected with the internal
organisation of the parties, for instance, the small and largely voluntary
party apparatus, limited financial resources, and the lack of centralisation
and internal homogeneity.19 These characteristics of the political parties can
be largely explained with reference to special features of the Swiss political
system.
Switzerland is a small country with a strong social and cultural diversity.
Different language areas, confessions and degrees of urbanisation provide
for all sorts of cleavages. Together with the very federalistic structure of the
Swiss political system and the predominantly autonomous municipalities,
the Swiss parties are, despite their large number, somewhat heterogeneous
and stratarchically organised. Altogether there are about 180 cantonal
parties and roughly 5,000 local parties.20 As a consequence, the national
parties have to make great efforts to solve their integration and co-
ordination problems. At the same time, however, a decentralised party
structure enhances flexibility in dealing with local and regional
particularities21 and offers more opportunities for voter identification. In
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cases where the cantonal party deviates from the national party, the party
members can choose, according to their own preferences, which party to
identify with more.
Even though the system of direct democracy contributed early on to the
formation of the political parties in Switzerland,22 most analysts argue that,
at the end of the twentieth century, direct democracy weakens the position
of the parties.23 During voting campaigns, the financially strong interest
groups and the social movements, which are easy to mobilise, far outpace
the political parties. In addition, given the possibility of correcting
unfavourable decisions by the popular vote, the elections themselves are
relatively unimportant. Recent studies have shown, however, that in those
cantons where initiatives and referenda are frequent, the parties tend to be
better organised.24 Either a large number of direct democratic ballots tends
to force the parties to engage in continuous political activism, and this might
lead them to professionalise their internal organisation, or having sufficient
organisational capacity they tend to resort more often to direct-democratic
instruments. 
For small and heterogeneous states, a conflict regulation pattern based
on consensus and power-sharing seems to be more appropriate.25 The Swiss
system of consensus democracy (consociationalism) allows the most
important parties to participate in government. This provides much more
integration than majoritarian systems with a strong division between the
parties in government and parties in the opposition. In a consensus
democracy, political problems are solved quietly. Representatives of the
main interest groups take part in the decision-making process at an early
stage and help to find a compromise to solve political problems. Such a
conflict regulation pattern guarantees political stability, but blurs the
borders between political interest groups and government actors. It remains
unclear whose interests prevail in putting together a proposal.26 Political
parties tend to lose the possibility of showing their constituents a distinctive
political profile. 
Finally, the Milizsystem,27 which is in part a consequence of the small
size of the country, but which is also considered to be an element of Swiss
political culture, weakens the position of the parties. Even though the
Milizsystem has some advantages in that it favours the combination of roles
across the social and political sub-systems,28 it also implies that most
political work is done by amateur politicians in a largely unprofessional
manner. Finally, since the parties are able to offer their members only
unpaid positions, this does not significantly enhance the attractiveness of
the parties. 
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There seems to be a broad consensus among various authors29 that
political parties have passed through different stages of development during
the twentieth century.30 Three forms of political party are usually
distinguished. Until about 1920, the parties were mainly cadre or elite
parties. With the consolidation of the Western democracies between 1920
and 1960, mass-membership parties emerged. Since 1960, the parties have
become dissociated from their membership base and turned into Otto
Kirchheimer’s catch-all parties31 or into Angelo Panebianco’s professional
electoral parties.32 The latter two are no longer committed to ‘grand
ideologies’ or to a particular segment of the population, but seek primarily
to increase votes and seats. Richard Katz and Peter Mair add to these
different developmental stages a further party type, the cartel party, which
has emerged since 1970.33 This new form of party has moved closer to, and
is strongly subsidised by, the state.
The question is, of course, whether Swiss parties follow these lines of
party development. Especially in the case of the catch-all party and the
professional electoral party, and to a lesser extent for the cartel party, the
weakened link to their traditional basis would question Lipset and Rokkan’s
frozen party system thesis.34 If only the names of the traditional parties
survive, and they no longer represent the cleavage responsible for their
emergence in terms of socio-structural basis and political orientation, the
party system has changed and can no longer be considered as frozen.
Unfortunately, for most of the ideal types of party organisation, clear
concepts of operationalisation are missing. Therefore, we shall concentrate
on a few party characteristics, describing some features of the ideal types,
such as professionalisation and financial resources of party organisations,
party ties, membership figures and composition, the balance of power
within the parties and the political orientation.
Professionalisation: A Slight Increase on a Low Level
In the mid-1970s, the parties of the medium-sized and larger cantons
began to staff their secretariats with full-time employees.35 A survey
conducted by the author in 1996/97 shows that the cantonal parties of the
four governmental parties had 74 full-time positions in total. Added to the
45 positions of the national party organisations, this amounts to a total of
nearly 120 full-time posts. Henry Kerr reports for the 1970s, on the basis
of personal interviews with party officials, a total of 87.5 full-time staff
members at cantonal and national level together.36 Since the middle of the
1970s, the number of full-time employees has thus increased by 40 per
cent at the best. Compared to developments in other countries,37 the
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increase of professionalisation in Switzerland is below average. Only
Great Britain and the Netherlands have lower rates of increase, but in
absolute terms these countries have a generally higher level of
professionalisation. Moreover, in Switzerland, full-time employees are
typically engaged in the administrative apparatus of the party, and
therefore the actual level of professionalisation of the party’s purely
political activities is probably even lower. According to information
provided by the parties themselves, about 72 per cent of the cantonal
parties have become more professional in their administrative work, and
60 per cent in their programmatic and substantive activities, during the
last ten years.38 It is noteworthy that especially the two most successful
parties, the SP and the SVP, claim to work more professionally with
regard to substantive issues.
Nevertheless, the conclusion reached by Hans Peter Fagagnini in the
mid-1970s that the party organisations in Switzerland are based on the
Milizsystem39 is still valid today: the number of individuals who deal
professionally with politics remains very small. Professional politicians are
to be found mainly among representatives of interest groups and other
persons who deal with questions that lie at the basis of political decisions.
These are usually lobbyists or parliamentarians.40 The party organisations
themselves employ only a small number of politically versatile collaborators. 
Financial Resources: No State Funding and Increasing Difficulties
In comparison with parties of other countries, the Swiss parties have only
limited financial resources, both in absolute terms, as well as in terms of
growth rates over recent years. Partly responsible for this is the almost total
lack of state funding. On the national level there is only a modest
contribution to the parliamentary groups of about 5.5 million Swiss francs.
In 1975 the ordinary budget of the four governmental parties on national
level was 2.5 million francs (FDP: 0.8 million; CVP: 0.8 million; SP: 0.7
million; SVP: 0.2 million).41 At the end of the 1980s, the total budget of the
four governing parties amounted to 5.6 million francs (SP: 1.7 million;
CVP: 1.6 million; FDP: 1.4 million; SVP: 0.9 million).42 In 1999, the four
governing parties reported a total budget (without election costs) of 9.4
million francs (FDP: 2.6 million; CVP: 2.3 million; SP: 3.1 million; SVP:
1.4 million). Compared to most of the other countries the budgets of the
Swiss parties are very small. And even the increase in recent years is hardly
impressive when we consider the average rate of inflation. In the last three
decades the four parties have in real terms roughly doubled their budget.
The ordinary budget of all four governmental parties together on a national
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level is, for instance, considerably lower than the sum an organisation like
Greenpeace receives in donations.
The fact that the Social Democrats have the largest budget on national
level is striking. This is due to the fact that these figures do not account
for all ‘costs’. Contributions to electoral or voting campaigns, to a large
extent, do not show up in the ‘operative budgets’ of the parties on the
right. If these contributions could be taken into account, it could probably
be shown that in reality the bourgeois parties, because of their
connections with financially strong business circles, have more funds at
their disposal. 
The national parties’ lack of financial resources is a matter of constant
concern. In the last 30 years, there have been different unsuccessful
attempts to introduce a system of state financing. In 1999, for the first time,
all four governmental parties jointly tried to re-start the discussion. The
financial situation of the cantonal parties is only slightly better. About 37
per cent of the 90 cantonal parties in our sample claim that they dispose of
more money than in previous years. For 21 per cent the financial situation
has not changed, whereas 42 per cent claim to be worse off. For FDP and
CVP especially, the financial situation is not very comfortable; in both
parties a majority of the cantonal sections claim to have comparatively less
money than in earlier days.43 Both parties, as we have seen, are also fighting
electoral problems.
The Parties on the Ground: Dealignment and Realignment 
If there is a general pattern in the development of Western European party
systems, it is the decline of party ties. However, there is great variation
between countries, as well as between parties.44 Various surveys have shown
that an ever-decreasing percentage of the population identifies closely with
a political party.45 While in the early 1980s, after a period of decline, about
50 per cent of the voters identified with one of the governing parties, this
figure had dropped to one-third by 1995.46 In 1995, more than half of the
voters declared that they did not identify with any party. Concurrently, the
number of floating voters has increased significantly, particularly between
1971 and 1987.47
In Switzerland, the principle of party membership developed relatively
late and only partially, which is evidenced by the largely unsuccessful
attempts of the FDP and the CVP to introduce this principle in the 1970s
and 1990s in all cantonal and local branches. One possible explanation of
this can be found in the party press, which until 1970 played a relatively
important role. The parties organised themselves through the party press,
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that is, the readers represented members and followers, and, as a
consequence, there was no need to develop clear criteria for membership
and to establish organisational structures for such a task.48
In 1963–67, according to Erich Gruner’s estimates, 38 per cent of active
voters were party members. In his view, the introduction of female suffrage
reduced this number by half. In the 1970s, it amounted to 11 per cent of the
eligible voters, which corresponds to approximately 390,000 party
members. At the time, Gruner considered the Swiss parties’ level of
organisation to be relatively high by international comparison.49 According
to indications given by the parties themselves, they had approximately
400,000 members in the mid-1990s, just as in Gruner’s time. If we take
into account the fact that during these 20 years the number of voters has
increased by 900,000, this implies that the percentage of party members
has declined, a development which is confirmed by recent surveys.
According to the studies by Longchamp between 1983 and 1994, the share
of party members among the eligible voters declined from 18 to 12 per
cent.50
The use of a more restrictive concept of membership, which eliminates
those entries that (due to the lack of the principle of membership) were
based on the more encompassing notion of ‘followers’, lowers the
percentage of party members even further to seven per cent of the voters.
From this perspective, the Swiss parties had only about 300,000 members
in 1997. In international comparison, Switzerland still occupies a leading
position in the middle field; in Germany, Holland, England and France,
the parties have considerably fewer, in Austria considerably more
members.51
As long as parties, as in the Swiss case, do not have central membership
files, it is very difficult to establish trends in membership figures over time.
In Switzerland, only the Social Democrats have the possibility of showing
a plausible (negative) trend in their membership figures, whereas the other
parties depend at the very best on estimations. About 40 per cent of the
cantonal sections of the four governmental parties claim to have increased
their membership figures in recent years, only about 24 per cent admit that
they have fewer members.52 If we take into account the size of the parties
(weighted percentages), we get a more accurate picture of the total trend. In
this perspective, a downward trend comes out clearly, since it is mainly the
small and newer cantonal parties which pretend to gain members, whereas
the more important bigger parties have declining figures. But even here, the
result is probably too positive for the parties. For example, in the case of the
Social Democrats, which experienced according to their official statistics a
137SWISS POLITICAL PARTIES:  BETWEEN PERSISTENCE & CHANGE
242wep07.qxd  02/05/2001  15:46  Page 137
clear loss in recent decades, the balance turns out to be even. It is thus very
likely that party officials tend to put their membership figures in too
favourable a light. Anyway, the two parties suffering most from a decrease
of their membership figures are FDP and CVP. 
In regard to the members and voters of the different parties, most
striking is the shift in the social basis of the Social Democrats and the
Swiss People’s Party. The Social Democrats have lost a part of their
traditional membership to the Swiss People’s Party. Yet they have gained
a considerable number of better educated people earning higher salaries.
In 1975 only seven per cent of their voters had an university degree,53
whereas in 1999 the SP was, with 51 per cent, the party with the highest
percentage of voters having a high level of education.54 As far as income
is concerned, the SP ranks with its percentage of well-off voters just
behind the FDP and well ahead of CVP and SVP, while among the people
from the highest income category the SP is the most popular party. The
Swiss People’s Party, in contrast, moved into the cities and into
predominantly Catholic areas. In 1975 only eight per cent of their voters
lived in urban areas,55 in 1999 it was 38 per cent.56 The percentage of
Catholic voters increased according to the same source from 16.5 in 1975
to 34 in 1999. 
The Increasing Importance of Public Office and Central Office
The balance of power between the different faces of party organisations57
and intra-party decision-making are other important features of political
parties. Professional electoral parties and cartel parties have a strong bias
towards the party leaders (party in central office) and the office-holders
(party in public office). In the 1980s with the rise of green parties, grass-
roots democracy was very popular. In the 1990s this changed. Party leaders
are not only constantly asked to present their position in the media without
being able to consult their basis, but they also need enough room and
competence for strategic behaviour. There has within the Swiss parties
obviously been a shift towards more operative freedom for the party leaders.
About two-thirds of the cantonal sections of the four governmental parties
claim that leadership is more important than co-determination of the party
members and almost half of them claim that there has been a shift in the
priorities in this direction within the last few years (see Table 1). This
change has been especially strong for the Social Democrats (SP) and the
Christian Democrats (CVP).
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Political Orientation: There are Still Differences
In 1965, Otto Kirchheimer predicted a lessening in the importance of the
parties’ ideologies and a trend towards a two-party system with very few
ideological differences between the two parties.58 Obviously his predictions
were wrong. Switzerland still has a multi-party system and the differences
between some of the parties have even increased. Especially salient is the
shift of the successful Swiss People’s Party. Older studies covering the
1970s place the SVP much more in the middle and even to the Left of FDP
and CVP.59 More recent studies situate the Swiss People’s Party clearly on
the Right.60 Studies analysing the parties’ electoral programmes61 reveal that
the Swiss People’s Party has clearly changed its political orientation to the
Right as far as political issues are concerned. The Social Democrats on the
other side have increased their Left orientation and consider themselves as
one of the most leftist and ecological Social Democratic parties.
To sum up, despite many similarities in the development of the Swiss
parties, it is impossible to discern a uniform pattern. The Swiss parties,
especially if the cantonal parties are also taken into account, cover almost
the entire spectrum of party types discussed in the literature. It is still
possible to find cantonal-level parties that are best characterised as elite
parties, especially in central Switzerland. Some parties, such as the SP, are
clearly based on the principle of membership, while others – such as the
former LdU or, at a lower level of organisation, the SD and the FPS – come
close to the model of a electoral party. Finally, there is little evidence that
the Swiss parties have moved closer to the state, a development which is
typical of cartel parties. Especially salient here is the lack of public funding
of the parties. Thanks to the Milizsystem, which even applies to the highest
levels of the political system, politicians have been able to maintain a
certain degree of independence. The system of concordance and the multi-
party system seem to ensure that a considerable number of public sector
positions are not allocated on the basis of party membership alone.
However, given the high density of political offices in Switzerland, the
parties have always had relatively easy access to political mandates. 
PERSISTENCE OR CHANGE?
How can the Swiss party system and the Swiss parties be characterised at
the end of the twentieth century in terms of persistence and change? At first
glance, persistence seems to prevail. The four governmental parties control
more votes than during the last 30 years and, in regard to their organisations,
there have not been fundamental changes which would allow us to speak
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about a new party system, hardly comparable to the one in the 1960s or even
in the 1920s. Despite partial support for some of the characteristics, Swiss
parties cannot be described as catch-all parties in the sense of Kirchheimer,62
nor as professional electoral parties in the sense of Panebianco,63 or cartel
parties in the sense of Katz and Mair,64 which would mark a quite important
difference from traditional parties on the basis of members and political
ideologies.
However, the image of stability and persistence has to be questioned for
three reasons. First, the Swiss parties, like parties in many other countries,65
lost support from party members. Party ties have weakened. The
impressively good electoral results of the four large parties together are on
less firm ground than they used to be. Secondly, the cleavages responsible
for the emergence of the four parties are less dominant, some have partially
disappeared and, what is even more striking, there has been a switch in the
social basis of the different parties. Traditional working-class voters of the
Social Democrats have changed to the right-wing Swiss People’s Party and,
with its most recent turn towards more neo-liberal policies, the Swiss
People’s Party has become more attractive for voters of the Radical Party.
The Social Democrats, on the other hand, have become much more popular
among well-educated people with relatively high salaries. Thus, we have
the same parties, but their social bases and their political claims have
changed. And, thirdly, the success of the Swiss Peoples’ Party has made a
reorganisation of the Swiss party system more likely than ever. 
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